ENFORCEMENT COSTS and THE CHOICE OF POLICY INSTRUMENTS FOR CONTROLLING POLLUTION
- 1 October 1992
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in Economic Inquiry
- Vol. 30 (4), 714-721
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1465-7295.1992.tb01292.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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