Cooperation, Mimesis, and Local Interaction
- 1 February 2000
- journal article
- Published by SAGE Publications in Sociological Methods & Research
- Vol. 28 (3), 341-364
- https://doi.org/10.1177/0049124100028003006
Abstract
In a population with a local interaction structure, where individuals interact with their neighbors and learning is by way of imitating a successful neighbor, cooperation is shown to be a stable strategy that cannot easily be eliminated from the population.Keywords
This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
- The emergence of kinship behavior in structured populations of unrelated individualsInternational Journal of Game Theory, 1999
- The Arithmetics of Mutual HelpScientific American, 1995
- THE SPATIAL DILEMMAS OF EVOLUTIONInternational Journal of Bifurcation and Chaos, 1993
- The Evolution of ConventionsEconometrica, 1993
- Learning, Mutation, and Long Run Equilibria in GamesEconometrica, 1993
- Evolutionary games and spatial chaosNature, 1992
- The genetical evolution of social behaviour. IJournal of Theoretical Biology, 1964