From Balance to Deterrence: A Theoretical Analysis
- 18 July 1957
- journal article
- Published by Project MUSE in World Politics
- Vol. 9 (4), 494-529
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2009422
Abstract
New weapons, and the new strategies and tactics which they make possible, alter the conduct of wars.† But they may also induce changes in the conduct—warlike or peaceful—of international affairs. This happens for either or both of two quite different kinds of reason. First and least importantly, a new weapon may tilt the balance in favor of those nations pre-eminent in the skill to use or the resources to produce it. Second and more profoundly, it may cause the major contending Powers to adopt new or radically extended strategies, calling in their turn for a complete reassessment of national interests, and of the value of resources, alliances, and conventional armaments.Keywords
This publication has 2 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Monte Carlo Model of Lanchester's Square LawOperations Research, 1956
- An Analysis of Power, with Special Reference to International PoliticsWorld Politics, 1951