Limitations on the use of information-revealing incentive schemes in economic organizations
- 30 September 1981
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Comparative Economics
- Vol. 5 (3), 251-271
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0147-5967(81)90046-9
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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