The Mystical Self: Lost and Found

Abstract

The empirical literature on self and the conceptual literature on self-loss have failed to influence one another, this despite the fact that the unity of selfhood is both a conceptual and empirical claim in each literature. However, the self unified is radically different in each piece of literature. Focusing on William James and his criticism of Hume, we argue that phenomenological or introspective methods are crucial in establishing that the unity of the reflexive self demands no transcendent I to establish its identity. Empirically, the unity of selfhood is assured and thus is conceptually nonproblematic. However, in the study of mysticism, a transcendent I is revealed whose unity is not that of selfhood as empirically studied, but rather is a unity with Reality, God, or the Absolute for which the concept of a soulful self is useful. Introspective or phenomenological methods provide a necessary base from which further empirical studies of the self can be extended. Such studies are unlikely unless spiritual or religious perspectives are appreciated in other than a reductive fashion.