Social austerity versus structural reform in European health systems: a four-country comparison of health reforms.

Abstract

Cost containment has captured the attention of health policymakers in most OECD countries, and deliberations about creating powerful financial incentives dominate health care politics. Some European health systems are now implementing hospital payment schemes that mirror the U.S. model of diagnosis-related groups (DRGs) and are raising premiums and copayment levels in an effort to limit public expenditures. Though financial incentives may indeed help rein in health expenditures, focusing predominantly on financial incentives hinders due consideration of needed structural reforms that improve the continuity, quality, and appropriateness of health care service delivery. This article focuses on the structural specifics of two legally enacted health insurance systems (Germany and Austria) and two national health systems (Great Britain and Denmark) to discuss the influence of structural characteristics on cost-containment efforts. Structural reform strategies discussed include increasing reliance on general practitioners, improving coordination of community and hospital-based specialty care, addressing the stark divide between ambulatory and hospital-based care that exists in some European health systems, and improving continuity of care by better integrating medical and social care sectors. Also discussed is the relative focus on financial incentives versus structural deficits in recent European health care reform strategies.