Who Governs Intermediary Agencies? Principal-Agent Relations in Research Policy-Making
- 1 April 1993
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Journal of Public Policy
- Vol. 13 (2), 135-162
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0143814x00000994
Abstract
The role of semi-public intermediary institutions is underestimated in political research. This paper elaborates the dynamics of the interaction pattern of mission-agencies, promoting and conducting research in the United States, Great Britain, France and Germany. The principal-agent-model serves as the organizing theoretical concept. By stressing the role of the third party, usually neglected in the model, it is shown that intermediary agencies in policy-making are drawn into cooperative and almost symbiotic relationships with the recipients of programs. The use of intermediary agencies becomes a double-edged sword for policy-makers. While close relationships with the scientific community improve the acceptance of political research programs, the formulation of research policies becomes subject to compromise and coalition building within funding agencies.Keywords
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