Error Correction, Attitude Persistence, and Executive Rewards and Punishments: A Behavioral Theory of Presidential Approval
- 1 January 1992
- journal article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in Political Analysis
- Vol. 4, 127-183
- https://doi.org/10.1093/pan/4.1.127
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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