Corruption
- 1 August 1993
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Oxford University Press (OUP) in The Quarterly Journal of Economics
- Vol. 108 (3), 599-617
- https://doi.org/10.2307/2118402
Abstract
This paper presents two propositions about corruption. First, the structure of government institutions and of the political process are very important determinants of the level of corruption. In particular, weak governments that do not control their agencies experience very high corruption levels. Second, the illegality of corruption and the need for secrecy make it much more distortionary and costly than its sister activity, taxation. These results may explain why, in some less developed countries, corruption is so high and so costly to development.This publication has 3 references indexed in Scilit:
- Economic Growth in a Cross Section of CountriesThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1991
- The economics of corruptionJournal of Public Economics, 1975
- Economic Development Through Bureaucratic CorruptionAmerican Behavioral Scientist, 1964