Insider Trading Subsequent to Initial Public Offerings: Evidence from Expirations of Lock-Up Provisions
Preprint
- 1 January 2000
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper explores the role of investment bankers and lock-up provisions in the market for new equity issues. In a sample of 1,948 IPOs, we find support for tKeywords
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