Trading in strategic resources: Necessary conditions, transaction cost problems, and choice of exchange structure
- 1 May 1994
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Wiley in Strategic Management Journal
- Vol. 15 (4), 271-290
- https://doi.org/10.1002/smj.4250150403
Abstract
The paper develops a theoretical framework for analyzing the exchange structure in the trading of imperfectly imitable and imperfectly mobile firm resources. It first explores the conditions for such resources to be gainfully traded between firms and then investigates the interconnections between barriers to imitation and impediments to trading. A major part of the paper is devoted to developing an integrative and yet parsimonious model for assessing the exchange structure between firms that are involved in the trading of strategic resources in the face of signifcant transaction cost problems. The model is applied in the last part of the paper to the analysis of the choice between acquisitions and collaborative ventures.This publication has 44 references indexed in Scilit:
- The cornerstones of competitive advantage: A resource‐based viewStrategic Management Journal, 1993
- Information asymmetries: A source of competitive advantage for diversified service firmsStrategic Management Journal, 1990
- Toward a Theory of Discounted Repeated Games with Imperfect MonitoringEconometrica, 1990
- Can the “New Forms of Investment” Substitute for the “Old Forms?” A Transaction Costs PerspectiveJournal of International Business Studies, 1989
- An Intertemporal Model of WarrantiesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1988
- Product Warranties and Double Moral HazardThe RAND Journal of Economics, 1985
- Moral Hazard in TeamsThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1982
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- The Market for "Lemons": Quality Uncertainty and the Market MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1970
- The Problem of Social CostThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1960