The regulation of non-point-source pollution under imperfect and asymmetric information
- 31 March 1992
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Environmental Economics and Management
- Vol. 22 (2), 134-146
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0095-0696(92)90010-t
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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