Hirst's Forms of Knowledge and Körner's Categorial Frameworks

Abstract

Public policy on education is undergoing a number of significant changes. Hirst's theory of the forms of knowledge is influential in determining the direction of these. I consider his theory and examine its philosophical underpinning. I conclude that, in the absence of any other clear demonstration or argument, Hirst must be relying on Korner's analysis of categorial frameworks. I show that Korner's analysis only partly supports Hirst's theory. Further, I show that, if Korner's theory is correct, Hirst's theory needs modifying. The modification has practical implications for educational policy. I argue that Hirst is right that children need to be introduced to knowledge dealing with a range of ultimate categorial concepts. However, unlike Hirst, I argue that knowledge is not to be reduced to verbal knowledge. I also argue that there are not a limited number of forms of knowledge. Indeed education should extend a cautious welcome to the new ways of theorising that arise from different sectors of society. Moreover, there is a difference between highly theoretical, abstract knowledge and less theoretical concrete knowledge, which is highly significant in any consideration of education 5‐16, and which has been overlooked in the theory.