Far-sighted equilibria in 2 × 2, non-cooperative, repeated games
- 1 November 1989
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Theory and Decision
- Vol. 27 (3), 175-192
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00135094
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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