Optimal Crowdfunding Design
Preprint
- 1 January 2014
- preprint
- Published by Elsevier in SSRN Electronic Journal
Abstract
This paper investigates the optimal design of crowdfunding where crowdfunders are potential consumers with standard motivations and entrepreneurs are profit maxKeywords
All Related Versions
This publication has 5 references indexed in Scilit:
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