The Groves-Ledyard mechanism: An experimental study of institutional design
- 1 March 1996
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Public Economics
- Vol. 59 (3), 335-364
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0047-2727(95)01506-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 13 references indexed in Scilit:
- Contra Contractarianism: Some Reflections on the New InstitutionalismPolitics & Society, 1988
- An Experimental Analysis of Unanimity in Public Goods Provision MechanismsThe Review of Economic Studies, 1988
- Group Size Effects in Public Goods Provision: The Voluntary Contributions MechanismThe Quarterly Journal of Economics, 1988
- Counting Groves-Ledyard equilibria via degree theoryJournal of Mathematical Economics, 1983
- Behavioral explanations of efficient public good allocationsJournal of Public Economics, 1982
- Implementation of mechanism by processesJournal of Economic Behavior & Organization, 1981
- Committee Decisions under Majority Rule: An Experimental StudyAmerican Political Science Review, 1978
- Optimal Allocation of Public Goods: A Solution to the "Free Rider" ProblemEconometrica, 1977
- The Invariably Stable Cobweb ModelThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971
- The Stability of an Experimental Market with a Supply-Response LagSouthern Economic Journal, 1967