Security against eavesdropping in quantum cryptography
- 1 July 1996
- journal article
- research article
- Published by American Physical Society (APS) in Physical Review A
- Vol. 54 (1), 97-111
- https://doi.org/10.1103/physreva.54.97
Abstract
A sharp estimate is given for the amount of Shannon information and expected collision probability. This estimate is valid for all eavesdropping strategies described by a generalized measurement and restricted to the Hilbert space of the one-photon state. The optimal generalized measurement is explicitly given. © 1996 The American Physical Society.Keywords
This publication has 17 references indexed in Scilit:
- Quantum cryptography: How to beat the code breakers using quantum mechanicsContemporary Physics, 1995
- Quantum cryptographyContemporary Physics, 1995
- Quantum cryptography with coherent statesPhysical Review A, 1995
- Information Gain in Quantum EavesdroppingJournal of Modern Optics, 1994
- Eavesdropping on quantum-cryptographical systemsPhysical Review A, 1994
- Information-theoretic limits to quantum cryptographyPhysical Review A, 1993
- Quantum cryptography without conjugate codingPhysical Review A, 1993
- On A Fundamental Theorem of Quantum CryptographyJournal of Modern Optics, 1993
- Quantum cryptography using any two nonorthogonal statesPhysical Review Letters, 1992
- A single quantum cannot be clonedNature, 1982