International organization and the theory of property rights
- 1 January 1980
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 34 (3), 307-334
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300032355
Abstract
A specter haunts the world's bureaucrats: the specter of small government. Skepticism about the expanding role of government in most industrial nations has encouraged political economists to go back to some fundamental questions about what we really need government to do for us, whether it be for reasons of efficiency or equity. The aim of this paper is to suggest that some of the theories attacking “big” government are equally applicable in the realm of international organization (IO).Keywords
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