Economics of Alliances: The Lessons for Collective Action
- 1 September 2001
- journal article
- Published by American Economic Association in Journal of Economic Literature
- Vol. 39 (3), 869-896
- https://doi.org/10.1257/jel.39.3.869
Abstract
This essay provides an up-to-date summary of the findings of the literature on the economics of alliances. We show that the study of the economics of alliances has played a pivotal role in understanding and applying public good analysis to real-world applications. We establish that the manner in which alliances address burden sharing and allocative issues is related to strategic doctrines, weapon technology, perceived threats, and membership composition. Past contributions are evaluated, and areas needing further development are identified. The theoretical and empirical knowledge gained from the study of alliances is shown to be directly applicable to a wide range of international collectives.Keywords
This publication has 72 references indexed in Scilit:
- Conscription, peace‐keeping, and foreign assistance: NATO burden sharing in the post‐cold war eraDefence and Peace Economics, 1997
- What will NATO enlargement cost?Survival, 1996
- Nato burden sharing: 1960–1992Defence and Peace Economics, 1996
- Budgetary savings from conscription and burden sharing in NATODefence Economics, 1992
- The McGuire model and the economics of the NATO allianceDefence Economics, 1991
- Foreign trade, military alliance, and defence‐burden sharingDefence Economics, 1991
- A simple and untraditional analysis of western alliance burden‐sharingDefence Economics, 1990
- Defence expenditures by countries in allied and adversarial relationshipsDefence Economics, 1990
- On distinguishing the behavior of nuclear and non‐nuclear allies in NATODefence Economics, 1990
- Mixed public‐private benefit and public‐good supply with application to the NATO allianceDefence Economics, 1990