The congressional-bureaucratic system: a principal agent perspective (with applications to the SEC)
- 1 January 1984
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Public Choice
- Vol. 44 (1), 147-191
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00124821
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 20 references indexed in Scilit:
- Gatekeeping and Monopoly Power of Committees: An Analysis of Sincere and Sophisticated BehaviorAmerican Journal of Political Science, 1983
- Agency Problems and Residual ClaimsThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Separation of Ownership and ControlThe Journal of Law and Economics, 1983
- Legislative constraintsPublished by Cambridge University Press (CUP) ,1981
- SPENDING LIMITATIONS, AGENDA CONTROL AND VOTERS' EXPECTATIONSNational Tax Journal, 1979
- Moral Hazard and ObservabilityThe Bell Journal of Economics, 1979
- Theory of the firm: Managerial behavior, agency costs and ownership structureJournal of Financial Economics, 1976
- NYSE Fixed Commission Rates: A Private Cartel Goes PublicStanford Law Review, 1970
- Congress and the Securities and Exchange CommissionVirginia Law Review, 1959
- Uncertainty, Evolution, and Economic TheoryJournal of Political Economy, 1950