Constitution, Choice and Change: Problems with the `Logic of Appropriateness' and its Use in Constructivist Theory

Abstract

The debate between a moderate version of constructivist theory and rationalist theory centres primarily on the rationality of individual action. The article consists of an in-depth analysis of the `logic of appropriateness' (LoA) invoked in constructivist theory. The analysis reveals that the LoA is a structural explanation and understanding of individual action. As such, it is untenable as a theory of individual action. The implications of this structural bias are discussed in relation to three core claims of constructivist theory. Moderate constructivist theory claims, first, that norms are constitutive for actors' identities. Second, it claims that agents and structures are mutually constitutive. Third, it claims that changes in ideational structures do occur and lead to changes in political practice. I conclude that the LoA is able to account for the first of these claims, but that by virtue of being able to account for this claim, it is, at the level of a theory of individual action, inconsistent with the second, and unable to effectively account for the third.