Budgetary Strategies and Success at Multiple Decision Levels in the Norwegian Urban Setting
- 1 June 1975
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in American Political Science Review
- Vol. 69 (2), 543-558
- https://doi.org/10.2307/1959085
Abstract
The purpose of this article is to test a series of propositions about budgetary decision making, in the form of linear decision models, for the municipal government of Oslo, Norway, and to assess the consequences of such strategic choices for the long-term growth of agency activities. Budgetary decisions for forty-seven agencies at each of the four principal decision-making levels over a nineteen-year period serve as the basis for analysis. Results indicate that while the complexity of strategic choice is not related to long-term agency growth, the acquisitiveness of the agency strategy is an important determinant of growth. Intermediate budgetary reviewers are only partially successful in reducing the relationship between acquisitiveness and growth. Reference to a set of systematic interview materials in these same agencies, relevant to the cognitive assumptions of the models, suggests some reservations about model validity, at least in a minority of cases.This publication has 7 references indexed in Scilit:
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