Reputational constraints on monetary policy
- 31 May 1987
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Carnegie-Rochester Conference Series on Public Policy
- Vol. 26, 141-181
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2231(87)90024-8
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 19 references indexed in Scilit:
- A Theory of Ambiguity, Credibility, and Inflation under Discretion and Asymmetric InformationEconometrica, 1986
- Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete informationJournal of Monetary Economics, 1986
- Cooperative equilibria in finite horizon noncooperative supergamesJournal of Economic Theory, 1985
- Finitely Repeated GamesEconometrica, 1985
- Dynamic Games and Dynamic Contract TheoryJournal of Conflict Resolution, 1985
- A Positive Theory of Monetary Policy in a Natural Rate ModelJournal of Political Economy, 1983
- Inflationary Finance under Discretion and RulesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1983
- Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policyJournal of Monetary Economics, 1983
- On the Time Consistency of Optimal Policy in a Monetary EconomyEconometrica, 1978
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971