Reputation in a model of monetary policy with incomplete information
Open Access
- 31 January 1986
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Monetary Economics
- Vol. 17 (1), 3-20
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0304-3932(86)90003-6
Abstract
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This publication has 8 references indexed in Scilit:
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- Inflationary Finance under Discretion and RulesCanadian Journal of Economics/Revue canadienne d'économique, 1983
- Rules, discretion and reputation in a model of monetary policyJournal of Monetary Economics, 1983
- Predation, reputation, and entry deterrenceJournal of Economic Theory, 1982
- Reputation and imperfect informationJournal of Economic Theory, 1982
- Rules Rather than Discretion: The Inconsistency of Optimal PlansJournal of Political Economy, 1977
- A Non-cooperative Equilibrium for SupergamesThe Review of Economic Studies, 1971