A comparison of pricing rules for auctions and fair division games
- 1 September 1986
- journal article
- Published by Springer Nature in Social Choice and Welfare
- Vol. 3 (3), 177-198
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf00433534
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
This publication has 10 references indexed in Scilit:
- Auctions, public tenders, and fair division games: An axiomatic approachMathematical Social Sciences, 1986
- The Conditional Auction Mechanism for Sharing a SurplusThe Review of Economic Studies, 1984
- The Art & Science of NegotiationHarvard Law Review, 1983
- A Theory of Auctions and Competitive BiddingEconometrica, 1982
- Optimal Auction DesignMathematics of Operations Research, 1981
- State of the Art—Auctions and Bidding Models: A SurveyManagement Science, 1980
- Fair division with indivisible commoditiesJournal of Economic Theory, 1979
- A Game of Fair DivisionThe Review of Economic Studies, 1977
- Games with Incomplete Information Played by “Bayesian” Players, I–III Part I. The Basic ModelManagement Science, 1967
- COUNTERSPECULATION, AUCTIONS, AND COMPETITIVE SEALED TENDERSThe Journal of Finance, 1961