Manipulation of social decision functions
- 1 August 1977
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Theory
- Vol. 15 (2), 266-278
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0022-0531(77)90101-6
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 11 references indexed in Scilit:
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