Optimal employment contracts in a principal-agent relationship
- 1 June 1983
- journal article
- Published by Elsevier in Journal of Economic Behavior & Organization
- Vol. 4 (2-3), 69-90
- https://doi.org/10.1016/0167-2681(83)90001-x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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