Asymmetric information in insurance: general testable implications
- 1 December 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (4), 783-798
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00057.x
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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