Cooperation in the liberalization of international trade: after hegemony, what?
- 1 January 1987
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Cambridge University Press (CUP) in International Organization
- Vol. 41 (1), 1-26
- https://doi.org/10.1017/s0020818300000722
Abstract
Nations dwell in perpetual anarchy, for no central authority imposes limits on the pursuits of sovereign interests. … Because as states, they cannot cede ultimate control over their conduct to an supranational sovereign, they cannot guarantee that they will adhere to their promises. The possibility of a breach of promise can impede cooperation even when cooperation would leave all better off. Yet, at other times, states do realize common goals through cooperation under anarchy.Keywords
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