Problematic Status of Corporate Regulation in the United States: Towards a New Moral Order

Abstract

Evidence on the geographical dimensions of corporate restructuring in the United States suggests that, if left to themselves, corporations often break the law or at least the spirit of law in furthering their economic interests. The design and implementation of restructuring involving the spatial relocation of work is in many instances conceived with the goal of circumventing corporations' social obligations. Workers' pension entitlements (and their contractual agreements with corporations on many other matters) are at risk when the economic imperatives of competition and technical innovation are the driving forces behind corporations' actions. These issues are explored with respect to rational choice theory, advancing an argument to the effect that if corporate restructuring is only understood in these terms, the prospects for effective public regulation are bleak indeed. A regulatory framework that explicitly references moral standards could be, however, more effective because the terms of evaluation would be legitimately other than simple benefit-cost analysis. This last argument is briefly illustrated by reference to the moral component inherent in making contracts between agents.