Sequential auctions: theory and evidence from the Seattle Fur Exchange
- 1 March 2006
- journal article
- Published by Wiley in The RAND Journal of Economics
- Vol. 37 (1), 70-80
- https://doi.org/10.1111/j.1756-2171.2006.tb00004.x
Abstract
No abstract availableThis publication has 18 references indexed in Scilit:
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