Characterization and computation of nash-equilibria for auctions with incomplete information
- 1 December 1992
- journal article
- research article
- Published by Springer Nature in International Journal of Game Theory
- Vol. 20 (4), 393-418
- https://doi.org/10.1007/bf01271133
Abstract
No abstract availableKeywords
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